Baloch Of Northern Balochistan.

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Baloch Of Northern Balochistan And
Baloch Nationalism And Afghanistan.

Like Iran and Pakistan,Afghanistan,with an estimated population of 20 million,is a multinational state comprised of Pashtuns,as the dominant national group,Tajiks,Hazaras,Turkmen,Uzbeck,Nuristanis,Baluchis,and several other ethnic groups.Its small Baluchi population is estimated around 500,00,(Wali Muhammad Rakhashani, a Baloch Intellectual from northern Balochistan ,who died in August 2007, estimated that there 1.5 million Balochis in southern Afghanistan)**
who are concentrated mainly in the southwestern part of the country adjoining Iranian Balochistan. (38)They are divided into several major tribal groupings,including Brahuis(those tribes who speak Brahui language),Gorgich,Sanjarani,Narui,and several lesser tribes. There are also scattered Baluchi tribes and settelments along Afghanistan’s border with Iran,extending from south to north where the boundries of Iran,Afghanistan,and the former Soviet Union meet.
In contrast to Iran and Pakistan,Afghanistan has traditionally maintained close links with its Baluchi population through lending varying degrees of political and moral support to the Baluch nationalists, particularly in Pakistan. This policy has been pursued by succesive Afghan regimes irrespective of their forms of government or ideological persuasions.During the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah, Afghanistan actively supported the Baluch and Pashtun opposition to the imposition of One Unit Plan
in West Pakistan which was seen as an attempt by ruling Punjabis to absorb the minority provinces of NWFP(Pashtunistan)and Baluchistan(39). After overthrow of the monarchial regime and the establishment of the republican regime in 1974,Kabul pursued a much more vigorous policy of support for Baluch nationalists.During the Baluch insurgency against the Bhutto regime in the 1973-1977
period,President Mohammad Daud provided Baluchi guerillas and refugees with sanctuary bases in southern Afghanistan and allowed them daily access to the Baluchi programs of Radio Kabul,as will discussed in the next chapter.
Similarly,the 1978 overthrow of Daud regime by the pro-Soviet Marxist regime did not effect Kabul’s basic policy toward the Baluch nationalists. Both factions of Afghanistan’s ruling Communist party, Khalq(Masses) and Parcham(Banner) reaffirmed their support for the “Baluch liberation movement”. Soon after its takeover,the Khalq government headed by Taraki formally recognized the Baluch People’s Liberation Front and granted Baluchi guerillas political asylum,while under Daud they had enjoyed
only refugee status(40). Also,following the example of their non-communist predecessors,Marxist leaders treated the Baluch on a par with Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan. In a speech on 20 september 1979,Hafizullah Amin,Taraki’s sucessor,stated that “Our sincere and honest brotherhood with the Pashtuns and Baluchis has been sanctified by history. They have been one body in the course of history and have lived together like one brother,(41) a theme which had been universally echoed by previous Afghan rulers as well. The 1979 Soviet intervantion and replacement of Amin by Babrak Karmal,
the leader of the Parcham faction, did not change Kabul’s attitude forward the Baluch,as well be eleborated further in the next chapter. In publicaly justifying this policy,Afghan ruler,all Pashtuns,have stressed the historical,cultural, and religious bonds of brotherhood between the Baluch and Pashtuns. The historical basis of this notion appears to be the Baluch’s cooperation with Afghans in their invasion and overthrow of Safavid empire,
Baluchistan’s tributary status under Afghanistan for short period of fourteen years(1744-1758), and the 1758 treaty of Afghan-Baluch military alliance formed laergely as a response to more powerful Persian empire as mentioned in Chapter 1. In the context,not only did the Baluch and Pashtun maintain closer ploitical and military ties due to a common threat percived from Persia,but also shared similar tribal organizations and were bound by the Sunni religion vis-a-vis Shi’a Persia. Although these ties have served to provide both sides with some justification for their continuing cooperation,they in
themselves are not the most significant factors motiving Afghanistan’s consistent polices toward Baluch.
More fundamental, however, are geopolitical considerations in Kabul’s calculations. As well be elaborated in the next chapter, Afghanistan’s irredentist claims to the Pashtun-speaking areas in Pakistan, her desire to gain a foothold on the sea through Baluchistan, and her territorial dipute with Iran over the distribution of waters of the lower Helmand River are the main factors accounting for Kabul’s support of the Baluch national movement. Prior to Taliban government , Afghanistan’s primary aim was to bolster her demand for “Pashtunistan”, and issue that was the cornerstone of her foreign policy ever since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. As a result, she attempted to revive the historical Afghan-Baluch alliance and ties by calling for self-determination for both peoples and also through working for closer cooperation between Baluch and Pashtun nationalist in Pakistan. As previously mentioned, Pashtun and Baluch did form a coalition within the NAP(National Awami Party,party of Baluch and Pashtuns,before 1973), which first opposed the One Unit Plan and then came to power in Baluchistan(Pakistani occupied) and the NWFP(Pashtunistn) as a result of its victory in those provinces in the general election held in Pakistan in 1970.
Moreover, Afghanistan’s interst in Baluchistan appears also to be motivated by her geographically landlocked position, which could be overcome through access to the coasts of Baluchistan on the Arabian Sea. An indication of this is found in some Afghan maps of Pashtunistn, which have depicted the entire area of Baluchistan(Afghanistani and Pakistani) as constituting southern Pashtunistan. The historical base of such a territorial claim appears to be Afghanistan’s fourteen-year tributary rule over Baluchistan during the 1744-1758 period. Baluch, however, rject such a clam by invoking the 1758 treaty signed by the Afghan ruler King Ahmad Shah Durrani and the Baluch ruker Khan Nasir Khan, which restored Baluchi independence in exchange for a military alliance, as mentioned in Chapter 1(42).
So far, the issue of Afghanistan’s vague territorial claims on Baluchistan has been downplayed by both the Afghan governments and the Baluch nationalists due to the overriding concern with their disputes with Pakistan. Kabul’s demand for Pashtunistan is generally implied to include only the Pashtun-speaking region of Pakistan. Afghanistan has not described the Baluch as “Afghan” or Pashtuns, but has always referred to them as “Baluch”, thus recognizing their separate national identity. Instead, it has emphasized the historical links of “brotherhood” between the Afghans and Baluchis. The Baluch have also responded in kind by reaffirming their historically close links with Afghans and by demonstrating a strong willingness to accommodate the Afghan need foe access to the open sea whenever they established a state of their own. Afghan-Baluch cooperation is certain to continue as long as the Baluch and Pashtun national right and demand are not accommodated within Pakistan.
The Marxist regime specifically recognized Baluchi as a separate nationality by adopting and implementing the Soviet Union’s “nationalities model” in Afganistan. Accordingly . it embarked upon reconstituting the Baluchi majority areas as an autonomous administrative unit having Baluchi as its official language. In this respect, Baluchi and three minority languages(Uzbeck,Turkman,Nuristani) were added to the traditionally recognized Pashtu and Dari(Afghan Farsi) as offical languages of Afghanistan and were promoted through the Ministry of Information and Culture. In accordance with government plans for providing Baluchi-language schools in predominantly Baluchi regions, Baluchi-first-grade were scheduled to attend classes in their own language in September 1979. the government also inaugurated a Baluchi weekly newspaper, Soub(Victory), in September 1978(43). Given the present chaotic political situation in Afghanistan, it is too early to judge the policy of the (Before September 2001) government toward the Baluch.

From “IRAN AND ITS NATIONALITIES: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”
By Dr Mohammad Hasan Hosseinbor” Page 212-217.Printed in year 2000. At http://www.wordpress.com/baluchi
References:
** Added by Baluchi at http://www.wordpress.com/baluchi
(38)Louis Dupree ,Afghanistan(Princeton, Princeton University Press,1980).pp 59-64; Inayatullah Baloch, “Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan”,p 284.
(39)Inayatullah Baloch, “Afghanistan-Pastunistan-Baluchistan”, p 508
(40)Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p 81.
(41)Kabul Times,20 September 1970.
(42)For futher information on this treaty, as well as the official position taken by the former ruler of Kalat State, see Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Khan-I-Tarikh Baluch Kamum Wa Khawanin-I Baluch (Quetta,n.p, 1972),p 126.
(43)Naby, “The Iranian Frontier Nationalities”,pp 102-3. See, also, Eden Naby,”The Ethnic Fctor in Soviet-Afghan Relations”,Asian Survey 20 (March 1980):240.

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